Cardinal Assignment Mechanisms: Money Matters More than it Should

Francisco Martínez-Mora, Antonio Miralles and Caterina Calsamiglia

No 1150, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: Most environments where (possibly random) assignment mechanisms are used are such that participants have outside options. For instance private schools and private housing are options that participants in a public choice or public housing assignment problems may have. We postulate that cardinal mechanisms, as opposed to ordinal mechanisms, may be unfair for agents with less access to outside options. Chances inside the assignment process could favor agents with better outside options.

Keywords: random assignments; ordinal vs. cardinal mechanisms; outside options; unequal access (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D47 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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