Promotions and Productivity: The Role of Meritocracy and Pay Progression in the Public Sector

Philipp Kastrau, Erika Deserranno and Gianmarco León-Ciliotta
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Gianmarco León-Ciliotta ()

No 1239, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We study promotion incentives in the public sector by means of a ï¬ eld experiment with the Ministry of Health in Sierra Leone. We experimentally establish a new promotion criterion that links promotions to performance for the lowest tier of health workers and introduce variation in perceived pay progression by revealing to them the salary of their supervisors. We ï¬ nd that meritocratic promotions lead to higher worker productivity and that this effect is driven mainly by workers who are highly ranked in terms of performance and those who expect a steep pay progression. When promotions are not meritocratic, increasing the pay gradient reduces worker productivity through negative morale effects. The ï¬ ndings highlight the importance of taking into account the interactions between different tools of personnel policy.

Keywords: meritocracy; promotions; pay progression; worker productivity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 J31 M51 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eff and nep-hrm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Promotions and Productivity: The Role of Meritocracy and Pay Progression in the Public Sector (2025)
Working Paper: Promotions and productivity: The role of meritocracy and pay progression in the public sector (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:1239

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