Promotions and productivity: The role of meritocracy and pay progression in the public sector

Erika Deserranno, Philipp Kastrau and Gianmarco León-Ciliotta ()

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: We study promotion incentives in the public sector by means of a field experiment with the Ministry of Health in Sierra Leone. The experiment creates exogenous variation in meritocracy by linking promotions to performance and variation in perceived pay progression among the lowest tier of health workers. We find that meritocratic promotions lead to higher productivity, and more so when workers expect a steep pay increase. However, when promotions are not meritocratic, increasing the pay gradient reduces productivity through negative morale effects. The findings highlight the importance of taking into account the interactions between different tools of personnel policy.

Keywords: promotions; meritocracy; pay progression; worker productivity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 J31 M51 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Promotions and Productivity: The Role of Meritocracy and Pay Progression in the Public Sector (2025)
Working Paper: Promotions and Productivity: The Role of Meritocracy and Pay Progression in the Public Sector (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:1770

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