Self-Preferencing and Foreclosure in Digital Markets: Theories of Harm for Abuse Cases

Massimo Motta ()

No 1374, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: Antitrust agencies all over the world have been investigating large digital platforms for practices which may constitute an abuse of dominance. Here I discuss practices (including ‘selfpreferencing’ and denial or degradation of interoperability) which can be interpreted as foreclosure in vertically-related or complementary markets. I discuss in particular a few high-profile cases involving Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google. I focus on possible theories of harm for such cases and show that both original simple models and well-established economic theories (adapted or interpreted) provide a rationale for anti-competitive foreclosure.

Keywords: self-preferencing; abuse of dominance; monopolization; exclusionary practices; digital platforms; two-sided markets; vertical foreclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 K21 L10 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-law and nep-pay
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Working Paper: Self-preferencing and foreclosure in digital markets: Theories of harm for abuse cases (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:1374

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