Education, Matching and the Allocative Value of Romance

Alison Booth and Melvyn Coles

No 205, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: Societies are characterized by customs governing the allocation of non-market goods such as marital partnerships. We explore how such customs affect the educational investment decisions of young singles and the subsequent joint labor supply decisions of partnered couples. We consider two separate matching paradigms for agents with heterogeneous abilities – one where partners marry for money and the other where partners marry for romantic reasons orthogonal to productivity or debt. These generate different investment incentives and therefore have a real impact on the market economy. While marrying for money generates greater investment eficiency, romantic matching generates greater allocative efficiency, since more high ability individuals participate in the labour market. The analysis offers the possibility of explaining cross-country differences in educational investments and labor force participation based on matching regimes.

Keywords: education; matching; participation; marriage; cohabitation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I21 J12 J16 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://bw.bse.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/1205-file.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Education, Matching, and the Allocative Value of Romance (2010)
Journal Article: Education, Matching, and the Allocative Value of Romance (2010)
Working Paper: Education, Matching and the Allocative Value of Romance (2005)
Working Paper: Education, Matching and the Allocative Value of Romance (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:205

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bruno Guallar ().