Financial Incentives in Academia: Research versus Development

Albert Banal-Estanol and Ines Macho-Stadler

No 295, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of monetary rewards on the pattern of research. We build a simple repeated model of a researcher capable to obtain innovative ideas. We analyse how the legal environment affects the allocation of researcher's time between research and development. Although technology transfer objectives reduce the time spent in research, they might also induce researchers to conduct research that is more basic in nature, contrary to what the "skewing problem" would presage. We also show that our results hold even if development delays publication.

Keywords: Faculty behaviour; basic vs. applied research (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Financial Incentives in Academia: Research versus Development (2007)
Working Paper: Financial incentives in academia: research versus development (2007)
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