Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result

Bernardo Moreno () and Salvador Barberà ()

No 297, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: When the members of a voting body exhibit single peaked preferences, majority winners exist. Moreover, the median(s) of the preferred alternatives of voters is (are) indeed the majority (Condorcet) winner(s). This important result of Duncan Black has been crucial in the development of public economics and political economy. However, it only provides a sufficient condition, and there are many examples in the literature of environments where voting equilibria exist even if single peakedness does not hold. Some of them correspond to instances where other relevant conditions, not necessarily connected with single

Keywords: Single peaked; single crossing and intermediate preferences; majority (Condorcet) winners (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result (2011)
Working Paper: Top Monotonicity: A Common Root for Single Peakedness, Single Crossing and the Median Voter Result (2008)
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