Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result

Salvador Barberà () and Bernardo Moreno ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, vol. 73, issue 2, 345-359

Abstract: When members of a voting body exhibit single peaked preferences, pair-wise majority voting equilibria (Condorcet winners) always exist. Moreover, they coincide with the median(s) of the votersʼ most preferred alternatives. This important fact is known as the median voter result. Variants of it also apply when single-peakedness fails, but preferences verify other domain restrictions, such as single-crossing, intermediateness or order restriction. Austen-Smith and Banks (1999) also proved that the result holds under single-peakedness, for a wide class of voting rules that includes the majority rule as a special case, and conveniently redefined versions of a median. We extend and unify previous results. We propose a new domain condition, called top monotonicity, which encompasses all previous domains restrictions, allows for new ones and preserves a version of the median voter result for a large class of voting rules. We also show that top monotonicity arises in interesting economic environments.

Keywords: Single peaked; Single crossing and intermediate preferences; Majority (Condorcet) winners (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result (2015)
Working Paper: Top Monotonicity: A Common Root for Single Peakedness, Single Crossing and the Median Voter Result (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:2:p:345-359

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.004

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