Frames and Games

Christiane Schwieren and Jordi Brandts

No 301, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: Decision-makers are sometimes influenced by the way in which choice situations are presented to them or "framed." This can be seen as an important challenge to the social sciences, since strong and pervasive framing effects would make it difficult to study human behavior in a synthetic or theoretic manner. We present results from experiments with dilemma games designed to shed light on the effects of several frame variations. We study, among others, the particular public bad frame used by Andreoni (1995) and two more naturalistic frames involving stories. Our results show that none of the frame manipulations have a significant effect on average behavior, but we do find some effects on extreme behavior. We also find that incentives do matter where frames do not matter.

Keywords: experiments; Public Goods; Framing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Related works:
Chapter: Frames and Games (2007)
Working Paper: Frames and Games (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:301

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