Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets

Bettina Klaus (), Markus Walzl and Flip Klijn

No 385, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of indirect dominance, we investigate von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets. We show that a singleton is von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable if and only if the matching is stable (Theorem 1). We also present roommate markets with no and with a non-singleton von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set (Examples 1 and 2).

Keywords: core; roommate markets; farsighted stability; one- and two-sided matching; von Neumann-Morgenstern stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets (2011)
Working Paper: Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:385

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