Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets

Bettina Klaus (), Flip Klijn and Markus Walzl

No 09-135, Harvard Business School Working Papers from Harvard Business School

Abstract: Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of indirect dominance, we investigate von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets. We show that a singleton is von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable if and only if the matching is stable (Theorem 1). We also present roommate markets with no and with a non-singleton von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set (Examples 1 and 2).

Keywords: core; farsighted stability; one- and two-sided matching; roommate markets; von Neumann-Morgenstern stability. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2009-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets (2015)
Journal Article: Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hbs:wpaper:09-135

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