On Some Geometry and Equivalence Classes of Normal Form Games

Fabrizio Germano

No 42, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: Equivalence classes of normal form games are defined using the discontinuities of correspondences of standard equilibrium concepts like correlated, Nash, and robust equilibrium, or risk dominance and rationalizability. Resulting equivalence classes are fully characterized and compared across different equilibrium concepts for 2 x 2 games; larger games are also considered. It is argued that the procedure leads to broad and game-theoretically meaningful distinctions of games as well as to alternative ways of representing, comparing and testing equilibrium concepts.

Keywords: Non-cooperative games; classification and equivalence classes; experimental games; geometry of games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 C90 C91 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Related works:
Journal Article: On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games (2006)
Working Paper: On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games (2003)
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