On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games

Fabrizio Germano

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: Equivalence classes of normal form games are defined using the geometry of correspondences of standard equilibiurm concepts like correlated, Nash, and robust equilibrium or risk dominance and rationalizability. Resulting equivalence classes are fully characterized and compared across different equilibrium concepts for 2 x 2 games. It is argued that the procedure can lead to broad and game-theoretically meaningful distinctions of games as well as to alternative ways of viewing and testing equilibrium concepts. Larger games are also briefly considered.

Keywords: Non-cooperative games; classification and equivalence classes; experimental games; geometry of games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 C78 C90 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Related works:
Working Paper: On Some Geometry and Equivalence Classes of Normal Form Games (2015)
Journal Article: On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:669

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