Comparing Generalized Median Voter Schemes According to their Manipulability

R. Pablo Arribillaga and Jordi Massó
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jordi Masso

No 753, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions are stated using the two associated families of monotonic fixed ballots and depend very much on the power each agent has to unilaterally change the outcomes of the two generalized median voter schemes. We perform a specific analysis of all median voter schemes, the anonymous subfamily of generalized median voter schemes.

Keywords: strategy-proofness; generalized median voting schemes; anonymity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
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Related works:
Journal Article: Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability (2016)
Working Paper: Comparing Generalized Median Voter Schemes According to their Manipulability (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:753

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