Rank Gaps and the Size of the Core for Roommate Problems

Paula Jaramillo, Çaǧatay Kayı and Flip Klijn
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Çağatay Kayı

No 956, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: This paper deals with roommate problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) that are solvable, i.e., have a non-empty core (set of stable matchings). We study the assortativeness of stable matchings and the size of the core by means of maximal and average rank gaps. We provide upper bounds in terms of maximal and average disagreements in the agents' rankings. Finally, we show that most of our bounds are tight.

Keywords: stability; matching; core; roommate problem; rank gap; bound (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Working Paper: Rank Gaps and the Size of the Core for Roommate Problems (2017)
Working Paper: Rank Gaps and the Size of the Core for Roommate Problems (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:956

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