Rank Gaps and the Size of the Core for Roommate Problems

Paula Jaramillo, Cagatay Kayi and Flip Klijn

No 15499, Documentos de Trabajo from Universidad del Rosario

Abstract: This paper deals with roommate problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) that are solvable, i.e., have a non-empty core (set of stable matchings). We study the assortativeness of stable matchings and the size of the core by means of maximal and average rank gaps. We provide upper bounds in terms of maximal and average disagreements in the agents’ rankings. Finally, we show that most of our bounds are tight.

Keywords: Matching; roommate problem; stability; core; rank gap; bound (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19
Date: 2017-02-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Working Paper: Rank Gaps and the Size of the Core for Roommate Problems (2017)
Working Paper: Rank Gaps and the Size of the Core for Roommate Problems (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000092:015499

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