Prizes versus Wages with Envy and Pride

Ori Haimanko (orih@bgu.ac.il), Pradeep Dubey and John Geanakoplos (john.geanakoplos@yale.edu)
Additional contact information
John Geanakoplos: Yale University

No 518, Working Papers from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics

Abstract: We show that if agents are risk neutral, prizes outperform wages when there is sufficient pride and envy relative to the noisiness of performance. If agents are risk averse, prizes are a necessary supplement to wages (as bonuses).

Keywords: Envy; Pride; Wages; Prizes; Bonus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D01 D23 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/0518.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: PRIZES VERSUS WAGES WITH ENVY AND PRIDE (2013)
Working Paper: Prizes Versus Wages with Envy and Pride (2012)
Working Paper: Prizes versus Wages with Envy and Pride (2011)
Working Paper: Prizes versus Wages with Envy and Pride (2011)
Working Paper: Prizes versus Wages with Envy and Pride (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bgu:wpaper:0518

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