Prizes versus Wages with Envy and Pride

Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos () and Ori Haimanko ()
Additional contact information
John Geanakoplos: Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520, USA

No 1101, Working Papers from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics

Abstract: We show that if agents are risk neutral, prizes outperform wages if and only if there is sufficient pride and envy relative to the noisiness of performance. If agents are risk averse, prizes are a necessary supplement to wages (as bonuses).

Keywords: Envy; Pride; Wages; Prizes; Bonus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D01 D23 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm
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http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1101.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: PRIZES VERSUS WAGES WITH ENVY AND PRIDE (2013)
Working Paper: Prizes Versus Wages with Envy and Pride (2012)
Working Paper: Prizes versus Wages with Envy and Pride (2011)
Working Paper: Prizes versus Wages with Envy and Pride (2005)
Working Paper: Prizes versus Wages with Envy and Pride (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1101

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