MULTI-STAGE SEQUENTIAL ALL-PAY AUCTIONS

Aner Sela and Ella Segev ()
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Ella Segev: BGU

No 1211, Working Papers from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study multi-stage sequential all-pay contests (auctions) where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. We characterize the Perfect Baysian equilibrium of these multi-stage sequential all-pay contests and analyze the effect of the number of contestants, their types, and their order on the expected highest effort.

Keywords: Sequential contests; Tullock contests; budget constrains. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 O31 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1211.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Multi-stage sequential all-pay auctions (2014)
Working Paper: Multi-Stage Sequential All-Pay Auctions (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1211

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