Multi-stage sequential all-pay auctions

Ella Segev and Aner Sela

European Economic Review, 2014, vol. 70, issue C, 371-382

Abstract: We study multi-stage sequential all-pay contests (auctions) where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of these contests and analyze the effect of the number of contestants and their types on the contestants׳ expected highest effort.

Keywords: Sequential contests; All-pay auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Working Paper: MULTI-STAGE SEQUENTIAL ALL-PAY AUCTIONS (2012)
Working Paper: Multi-Stage Sequential All-Pay Auctions (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:70:y:2014:i:c:p:371-382

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.06.006

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