TULLOCK CONTESTS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

Ezra Einy (), Ori Haimanko (), Diego Moreno (), Aner Sela and Benyamin Shitovitz
Additional contact information
Ezra Einy: Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel
Benyamin Shitovitz: Department of Economics, University of Haifa

No 1303, Working Papers from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics

Abstract: Under standard assumptions about players'cost functions, we show that a Tullock contest with asymmetric information has a pure strategy equilibrium. Next we study Tullock contests in which players have a common value and a common state-independent linear cost function. A two-player contest in which one player has an information advantage has a unique equilibrium. In equilib- rium both players exert the same expected effort, and although the player with an information advantage wins the prize with probability less than one-half, his payoff is greater or equal to that of his opponent. When there are more than two players in the contest, having information advantage leads to higher payoffs, but the other properties of equilibrium no longer hold.

JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Downloads: (external link)
http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1303.pdf First version, 2013 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Tullock contests with asymmetric information (2013)
Working Paper: Tullock Contests with Asymmetric Information (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1303

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Aamer Abu-Qarn ().