Tullock contests with asymmetric information

Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko (), Aner Sela and Benyamin Shitovitz
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Diego Moreno ()

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We show that under standard assumptions a Tullock contest with asymmetric information has a pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium. Moreover, two-player common-value Tullock contests in which one of the players has an information advantage have a unique equilibrium. In equilibrium both players exert the same expected effort, and although the player with information advantage wins the prize with probability less than one-half, his payoff is greater or equal to that of his opponent. In common-value Tullock contests with more players any information advantage is rewarded, but the other properties of two players contests do not hold

Keywords: Tullock; contests; Common-values; All; pay; auctions; Asymmetric; information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Working Paper: TULLOCK CONTESTS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION (2013)
Working Paper: Tullock Contests with Asymmetric Information (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we1314

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