AUCTION MECHANISMS AND BIDDER COLLUSION: BRIBES, SIGNALS AND SELECTION

Aniol Llorente-Saguer and Ro'i Zultan

No 1406, Working Papers from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics

Keywords: auctions; collusion; bribes; experiment. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Auction Mechanisms and Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals and Selection (2014)
Working Paper: Auction Mechanisms and Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals and Selection (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1406

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