Symmetric play in repeated allocation games
Christoph Kuzmics,
Thomas Palfrey and
Brian Rogers
No 468, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
Abstract:
We study symmetric play in a class of repeated games when players are patient. We show that, while the use of symmetric strategy profiles essentially does not restrict the set of feasible payoffs, the set of equilibrium payoffs is an interesting proper subset of the feasible and individually rational set. We also provide a theory of how rational individuals play these games, identifying particular strategies as focal through the considerations of Pareto optimality and simplicity. We report experiments that support many aspects of this theory.
Keywords: repeated games; symmetry; experiments; focal points (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43
Date: 2014-04-17
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)
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https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2672493/2672494 First Version, 2012 (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Symmetric play in repeated allocation games (2014) 
Working Paper: Symmetric play in repeated allocation games (2012) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:468
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