Symmetric play in repeated allocation games
Christoph Kuzmics,
Thomas Palfrey and
Brian Rogers
No 1551, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Abstract:
We study symmetric play in a class of repeated games when players are patient. We show that, while the use of symmetric strategy profiles essentially does not restrict the set of feasible payoffs, the set of equilibrium payoffs is an interesting proper subset of the feasible and individually rational set. We also provide a theory of how rational individuals play these games, identifying particular strategies as focal through the considerations of Pareto optimality and simplicity. We report experiments that support many aspects of this theory. JEL Code: C73, C92, D63
Keywords: symmetry; repeated games; focal points; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-07-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Journal Article: Symmetric play in repeated allocation games (2014) 
Working Paper: Symmetric play in repeated allocation games (2014) 
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