A Note on the Impossibility of Efficient N-Person Compromises

Peter Postl

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Birmingham

Abstract: This note studies an allocation problem that generalizes the compromise setup of Borgers and Postl (2006) to a setting with more than two agents, and generalizes their impossibility result.

Keywords: mechanism; design; with; non-transferrable; utility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D70 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2006-06
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bir:birmec:06-06

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