A Note on the Impossibility of Efficient N-Person Compromises
Peter Postl ()
Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Birmingham
This note studies an allocation problem that generalizes the compromise setup of Borgers and Postl (2006) to a setting with more than two agents, and generalizes their impossibility result.
Keywords: mechanism; design; with; non-transferrable; utility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D70 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bir:birmec:06-06
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