Details about Peter Postl
Access statistics for papers by Peter Postl.
Last updated 2023-08-06. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: ppo295
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Working Papers
2011
- Efficiency versus Optimality in Procurement
Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham 
See also Journal Article Efficiency versus optimality in procurement, Economic Theory, Springer (2013) View citations (2) (2013)
- Strategy-Proof Compromises
Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham View citations (3)
See also Journal Article Strategy-Proof Compromises, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter (2011) View citations (5) (2011)
2006
- A Note on the Impossibility of Efficient N-Person Compromises
Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham
- Dominant Strategy Implementable Compromises
Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham
- Inefficient Procurement
Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham
Journal Articles
2014
- Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2014, 68, (C), 31-52 View citations (11)
2013
- A ‘divide and choose’ approach to compromising
Economics Letters, 2013, 119, (2), 204-209
- Efficiency versus optimality in procurement
Economic Theory, 2013, 53, (2), 425-472 View citations (2)
See also Working Paper Efficiency versus Optimality in Procurement, Discussion Papers (2011) (2011)
2011
- Strategy-Proof Compromises
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2011, 11, (1), 37 View citations (5)
See also Working Paper Strategy-Proof Compromises, Discussion Papers (2011) View citations (3) (2011)
2009
- Efficient compromising
Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 144, (5), 2057-2076 View citations (38)
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