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Details about Peter Postl

E-mail:
Postal address:Department of Economics University of Bath Bath BA2 7AY United Kingdom
Workplace:Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Peter Postl.

Last updated 2014-03-03. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: ppo295


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Working Papers

2011

  1. Efficiency versus Optimality in Procurement
    Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Economic Theory (2013)
  2. Strategy-Proof Compromises
    Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham Downloads View citations (3)
    See also Journal Article in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (2011)

2006

  1. A Note on the Impossibility of Efficient N-Person Compromises
    Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham
  2. Dominant Strategy Implementable Compromises
    Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham
  3. Inefficient Procurement
    Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham

Journal Articles

2014

  1. Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 2014, 68, (C), 31-52 Downloads View citations (11)

2013

  1. A ‘divide and choose’ approach to compromising
    Economics Letters, 2013, 119, (2), 204-209 Downloads
  2. Efficiency versus optimality in procurement
    Economic Theory, 2013, 53, (2), 425-472 Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper (2011)

2011

  1. Strategy-Proof Compromises
    The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2011, 11, (1), 1-37 Downloads View citations (5)
    See also Working Paper (2011)

2009

  1. Efficient compromising
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 144, (5), 2057-2076 Downloads View citations (33)
 
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