Strategy-Proof Compromises

Peter Postl

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Birmingham

Abstract: We study strategy-proof decision rules in the variants of the canonical public good model proposed by Borgers and Postl (2009). In this setup, we fully characterize the set of budget-balanced strategy-proof deterministic mechanisms, which are simple threshold rules. For smooth probabilistic mechanisms we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for dominant strategy implementation. When allowing for discontinuities in the mechanism, our necessary condition remains valid, but additional conditions must hold for sufficiency. We also show that, among ex posts efficient rules, only dictatorial ones are strategy-proof. While familiar in spirit, this result is not the consequence of any known result in the literature.

Keywords: Compromise; Dominant strategy implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D70 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2011-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Strategy-Proof Compromises (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bir:birmec:10-12

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