Coordination in 2 x 2 Games by Following Recommendations from Correlated Equilibria

John Bone (), Michalis Drouvelis and Indrajit Ray ()

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Birmingham

Abstract: We consider three games, Symmetric Battle of the Sexes, Modified Battle of the Sexes and Chicken and two different correlation devices, public and private, with the same expected payoffs in equilibrium, which is also the best correlated equilibrium payoff for these games. Despite our choices of the payoffs in these games based on some theoretical criteria, we find that coordination and following recommendations vary significantly among our treatments. We explain these differences by analysing players' choices in cases when they do and do not follow recommendations in different games.

Keywords: Coordination; Public message; Recommendation; Correlated equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2013-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bir:birmec:12-04

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