Allocating bank regulatory powers: lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision

Charles Kahn and Joao Santos

No 102, BIS Working Papers from Bank for International Settlements

Abstract: Bank regulation in most countries encompasses a lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision. These functions are interrelated and therefore require coordination among the authorities responsible for them. These authorities, however, are often established with different mandates, some of which are likely to be in conflict. We consider these issues by studying the optimal institutional allocation of such functions.

Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2001-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Allocating bank regulatory powers: Lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision (2005)
Working Paper: Allocating bank regulatory powers: lender of last resort, deposit insurance, and supervision (2001)
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