An impossibility theorem on truth-telling in fully decentralised systems

Rodney Garratt and Cyril Monnet

No 1117, BIS Working Papers from Bank for International Settlements

Abstract: We show that truthful reporting about the realization of a publicly observed event cannot be implemented as a unique equilibrium in a completely decentralized environment. Our work provides a theoretical underpinning of the need for oracles and the related "oracle problem".

Keywords: decentralized systems; smart contracts; truth-telling; oracle problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D86 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.bis.org/publ/work1117.pdf Full PDF document (application/pdf)
https://www.bis.org/publ/work1117.htm (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bis:biswps:1117

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in BIS Working Papers from Bank for International Settlements Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin Fessler ().