Central banks: between internationalisation and domestic political control

Harold James

No 327, BIS Working Papers from Bank for International Settlements

Abstract: The paper examines the exercise, the efficiency, and the legitimacy of the monetary policy-making process. The goal of central bank autonomy in recent times is the outcome of a demand for price stability. The realisation of autonomy is also a consequence of the fragmentation of national decision making, in federal systems but also in regional and international monetary arrangements. Economic and financial crisis changes the political economy, and produces a transition from seeing the central bank as producing a general or universalisable good (price stability) to interpreting monetary policy as fundamentally a tool for redistributive or factional policies. The latter will only work in the framework of national policy.

Keywords: central bank independence; central bank governance; monetary policy financial crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2010-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba and nep-mon
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bis:biswps:327

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