The Big Carrot:High-Stakes Incentives Revisited

Pablo Brañas-Garza, Teresa M. García-Muñoz () and Shoshana Neuman ()
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Shoshana Neuman: Department of Economics Bar-Ilan University

No 2009-23, Working Papers from Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Using an international dataset of about 35,000 subjects, this paper provides an empirical example of high-stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. First, we show that incentives (based on absolute belief) play a salient role in religious performance. Second, we find that, when both positive (heaven) and negative (hell) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven are much more relevant than beliefs in hell when estimating the production of religious commodities (church-attendance and praying equations).

Keywords: carrot/stick; high-stakes incentives; rewards; punishment; Economics of Religion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-07
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited (2008)
Working Paper: The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited (2008)
Working Paper: The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:biu:wpaper:2009-23

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