The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited

Pablo Brañas-Garza, Teresa M. García-Muñoz () and Shoshana Neuman ()
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Shoshana Neuman: Bar-Ilan University

No 3287, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper provides an empirical demonstration of high stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. It shows that, when both positive (carrot) and negative (stick) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven are much more relevant than beliefs in hell when estimating the production of religious commodities (church-attendance and praying equations).

Keywords: rewards; economics of religion; carrot/stick; punishment; high stakes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2008-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published - published in: Behavioral Decision Making, 2010, 23, 288-313

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https://docs.iza.org/dp3287.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Big Carrot:High-Stakes Incentives Revisited (2009)
Working Paper: The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited (2008)
Working Paper: The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited (2008)
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