Cooperation and Effort in Group Contests

Gil Epstein and Yosef Mealem

No 2011-28, Working Papers from Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good comparing two situations: (i) when all players act independently; and (ii) when the players of each group cooperate. This comparison leads us to the conclusion that it is possible for one group to contribute more (and have a higher expected payoff) in the non-cooperative regime than in the cooperative regime.

Keywords: Contests; rent seeking; public good; easy-riding. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2011-11
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Related works:
Journal Article: Cooperation and Effort in Group Contests (2012)
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