Cooperation and Effort in Group Contests

Gil Epstein and Yosef Mealem ()
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Yosef Mealem: Netanya Academic College

Economics Bulletin, 2012, vol. 32, issue 1, 624-638

Abstract: We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good comparing two situations: (i) where all players act independently; and (ii) where the players of each group cooperate. This comparison leads us to the conclusion that it is possible for one group to contribute more (and have a higher expected payoff) in the non-cooperative regime than in the cooperative regime. .

Keywords: Contests; rent seeking; public good; easy-riding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-02-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Cooperation and Effort in Group Contests (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00686

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