The Effect of Ideological Positions on Job Market Interaction
Gil S. Epstein (),
Anat Alexandron-Lavon and
Renana Lindner Pomerantz
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Gil S. Epstein: Bar-Ilan University
No 2017-11, Working Papers from Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
Reporters and editors may not have the same ideology. When an editor wants to employ a new reporter with a different ideology, they have to negotiate the price of moving from their own to the other's ideology. We focus on the job market for reporters, where the agents negotiate over the ideological position to be reported and wage. We adopt a spatial model in which each agent suffers a utility loss as the agreed-upon position moves away from his/her favored one. Equilibrium determines a threshold ideological gap for a match to be formed. Our analysis generates a natural separation between extreme, mildly extreme and moderate ideologies. Furthermore, we find that agents that hold extreme ideologies compromise less than moderates. This formulation may be applied to other situations in which agents involve monetary and non-monetary considerations, especially a preference for similarity.
Keywords: Media; Job Market; Ideological Position (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J32 J44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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