The Effect of Ideological Positions on Job Market Interaction

Anat Alexandron-Lavon, Gil Epstein and Renana Lindner Pomerantz ()
Additional contact information
Anat Alexandron-Lavon: Ruppin Academic Center
Renana Lindner Pomerantz: Bar-Ilan University

No 11152, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: Reporters and editors may not have the same ideology. When an editor wants to employ a new reporter with a different ideology, they have to negotiate the price of moving from their own to the other's ideology. We focus on the job market for reporters, where the agents negotiate over the ideological position to be reported and wage. We adopt a spatial model in which each agent suffers a utility loss as the agreed-upon position moves away from his/her favored one. Equilibrium determines a threshold ideological gap for a match to be formed. Our analysis generates a natural separation between extreme, mildly extreme and moderate ideologies. Furthermore, we find that agents that hold extreme ideologies compromise less than moderates. This formulation may be applied to other situations in which agents involve monetary and non-monetary considerations, especially a preference for similarity.

Keywords: ideological position; job market; media (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J32 J44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2017-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma
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Published - published as 'The effect of ideological positions on job market interaction: A spatial analysis' in: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2018, 145, 261 - 274

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Effect of Ideological Positions on Job Market Interaction (2017)
Working Paper: The Effect of Ideological Positions on Job Market Interaction (2017)
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