Clock versus consequence: How Delhi High Court operationalises Section 29A's time discipline

Prashant Narang and Renuka Sane

No 17, Working Papers from Trustbridge Rule of Law Foundation

Abstract: This paper studies how Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 works in practice. The provision sets a time limit for making arbitral awards and allows courts to extend time after the limit expires. Using a dataset of 202 reported orders of the Delhi High Court between 2015 and 2024, the paper examines how extension petitions are decided and whether courts use their powers to impose sanctions for delay. The findings show a clear pattern. Courts grant extensions in almost all cases, often within a few days and usually in a single hearing. By contrast, sanctions are rare. There are no instances of fee reduction, and only a small number of cases involve costs or replacement of arbitrators. Even repeat extension requests are routinely allowed without penalties. The paper argues that this pattern reflects the structure of Section 29A. Granting an extension is simple, especially when parties agree. Imposing sanctions requires courts to identify responsibility for delay and follow procedural safeguards, which takes more time and effort. As a result, the provision operates mainly as a mechanism to regularise delay rather than deter it. The study suggests that deadlines are effective only when consequences are predictable and easy to apply. Where sanctions depend on detailed judicial findings, they are used sparingly. This raises questions about whether court-based enforcement is the right tool for ensuring timely arbitration.

Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2026-03
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https://trustbridge.in/RePEc/papers/2026_Narangetal_clockVsConsequence.pdf First version, 2026 (application/pdf)

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