Weak regulation, game theory and ineffectiveness of the EU Information & Consultation Directive in liberal economies

Tony Dobbins, Tony Dundon, Niall Culliname, Eugene Hickland and Jimmy Donaghey
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Tony Dundon: NUI Galway, Ireland
Niall Culliname: Queens University Belfast
Eugene Hickland: NUI Galway, Ireland
Jimmy Donaghey: University of Warwick

No 15010, Working Papers from Bangor Business School, Prifysgol Bangor University (Cymru / Wales)

Abstract: This article provides theoretical and empirical insights relating to impact of the European Information and Consultation Directive (ICD). While existing research on the ICD offers important empirical insights, there is a need for further theoretical analysis to explain ineffectiveness of the regulations in liberal market economies (LMEs). Drawing on data from 16 case studies, the article uses game theory and the prisoners dilemma framework to explain why national implementing legislation is ineffective in diffusing mutual gains cooperation in two LMEs: UK, Republic of Ireland. Three theoretical propositions advance understanding of the ineffectiveness of national information & consultation regulations in LMEs.

Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2015-10
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