OPEC's crude game: Strategic Competition and Regime-switching in Global Oil Markets

Thomas Gundersen and Even Soltvedt Hvinden ()

No No 01/2021, Working Papers from Centre for Applied Macro- and Petroleum economics (CAMP), BI Norwegian Business School

Abstract: We develop a model of oligopolistic competition under imperfect monitoring and dynamic observable demand. Efficient symmetric equilibria feature disciplined cooperative regimes interrupted by rare but severe price wars. The model predicts that the frequency, duration, and supply schedule associated with each regime may persistently deviate from average behavior. We find evidence for the theoretical predictions of our model in historical Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) output using a Markov-switching Bayesian vector autoregressive model of the global oil market. The evidence suggests that conventional models without regime-switching of oil supply underestimates the linkages between quantities supplied and oil prices.

Keywords: Regime-switching; OPEC; cartel; price war; crude oil demand and supply (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 74 pages
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene and nep-ore
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bny:wpaper:0096

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