Free Trade Agreements with Environmental Provisions Between Asymmetric Countries: Transfer of Clean Technology and Enforcement

Hideo Konishi, Minoru Nakada and Akihisa Shibata

No 1063, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper investigates the e§ects of a free trade agreement (FTA) with environmental provisions between northern and southern countries. We explicitly consider clean technology transfers from the North to the South and the enforcement levels of adopting clean technology in the South, which have not been discussed so far. Southern producers beneÖt greatly from having unimpeded access to a northern market, but they are reluctant to use new high-cost, clean technology provided by the North. We investigate how environmentally conscious northern countries could design an FTA in which southern countries are provided with sufficient membership benefits but follow tighter enforcement requirements. We provide a quantitative evaluation of FTA policies using a numerical example.

Keywords: Free trade agreements; Deep integration; Technology transfer; Monetary transfer; Environmental provisions; Enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F15 F18 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-12-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-int
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Journal Article: Free trade agreements with environmental provisions between asymmetric countries: transfer of clean technology and enforcement (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boc:bocoec:1063

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