Core in a Simple Coalition Formation Game

Suryapratim Banerjee, Hideo Konishi and Tayfun Sönmez
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Suryapratim Banerjee: McGill University

No 449, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: We analyze the core of a class of coalition formation game in which every player's payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We first consider anonymous games and additively separable games. Neither of these strong properties guarantee the existence of a core allocation, even if additional strong properties are imposed. We then introduce two top-coalition properties each of which guarantee the existence. We show that these properties are independent of the Scarf-balancedness condition. Finally we give several economic applications.

Pages: 19 pages
Date: 1999-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-ind
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

Published, Social Choice and Welfare 18, 135-153, (2001).

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boc:bocoec:449

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