Core in a simple coalition formation game

Tayfun Sönmez, Suryapratim Banerjee and Hideo Konishi
Additional contact information
Suryapratim Banerjee: Department of Economics, McGill University, Montreal, Canada H3A 2T7

Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, vol. 18, issue 1, 135-153

Abstract: We analyze the core of a class of coalition formation game in which every player's payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We first consider anonymous games and additively separable games. Neither of these strong properties guarantee the existence of a core allocation, even if additional strong properties are imposed. We then introduce two top-coalition properties each of which guarantee the existence. We show that these properties are independent of the Scarf-balancedness condition. Finally we give several economic applications.

Date: 2001-01-10
Note: Received: 31 July 1999/Accepted: 5 January 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (257)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/papers/1018001/10180135.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
Working Paper: Core in a Simple Coalition Formation Game (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:1:p:135-153

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().