Super Majoritarianism and the Endowment Effect

Uriel Procaccia and Uzi Segal
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Uriel Procaccia: Hebrew University School of Law

No 510, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: The American and some other constitutions entrench property rights by requiring super majoritarian voting amending or revoking their own provisions. Following Buchanan and Tullock [5], this paper analyzes individuals' interests behind a veil of ignorance, and shows that under some standard assumptions, a (simple) majoritarian rule should be adopted. This result changes if one assumes that prefer- ences are consistent with the behavioral phenomenon known as the endowment effect." It then follows that (at least some) property rights are best defended by super majoritarian protection. The paper then shows that its theoretical results are consistent with a number of doctrines underlying American Constitutional Law.

Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2001-10-01, Revised 2002-03-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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Related works:
Journal Article: Super Majoritarianism and the Endowment Effect (2003)
Working Paper: Super Majoritarianism and the Endowment Effect (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boc:bocoec:510

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