Spatial Competition between Parking Garages and Downtown Parking Policy

Richard Arnott

No 627, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper looks at parking policy in dense urban districts ("downtown"), where spatial competition between parking garages is a key feature. The paper has four parts. The first looks at the "parking garage operator's problem". The second derives the equilibrium in the parking garage market when there is no on-street parking, compares the equilibrium to the social optimum, and examines parking policy in this context. The third considers how the presence of on-street parking alters the analysis, and the fourth extends the analysis to include mass transit.

JEL-codes: L91 R40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages
Date: 2005-09-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-geo and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Spatial competition between parking garages and downtown parking policy (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boc:bocoec:627

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