Congestion Tolling with Agglomeration Externalities

Richard Arnott

No 660, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: Consider an urban economy with two types of externalities, negative traffic congestion externalities and positive agglomeration externalities deriving from non-market interaction. Suppose that urban travel can be tolled, that non-market interaction cannot be subsidized, and that non-market interaction is stimulated by a reduction in travel costs. Then the optimal toll is below the congestion externality cost. This paper explores this line of reasoning.

JEL-codes: D60 H20 R40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2007-03-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-geo, nep-pbe and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (68)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Congestion tolling with agglomeration externalities (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boc:bocoec:660

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