Downtown Parking in Auto City

Richard Arnott and John Rowse
Additional contact information
John Rowse: University of Calgary

No 665, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper develops and calibrates a model of downtown parking in a city without mass transit, and applies it to investigate downtown parking policy. There is curbside and garage parking and traffic congestion. Spatial competition between private parking garages determines the equilibrium garage parking fee and spacing between parking garages. Curbside parking is priced below its social opportunity cost. Cruising for parking adjusts to equalize the full prices of on- and off-street parking, and contributes to traffic congestion. The central result is that raising curbside parking fees appears to be a very attractive policy since it generates efficiency gains that may be several times as large as the increased revenues raised.

Keywords: parking; traffic congestion; parking garages; parking policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: R40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2007-04-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-geo and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Downtown parking in auto city (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boc:bocoec:665

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