Standardization and the Stability of Collusion

Luca Lambertini (), Sougata Poddar () and D. Sasaki

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We characterize the interplay between firms' decision in terms of product standardization and the nature of their ensuing market behaviour. We prove the existence of a non-monotone relationship between firms' decision at the product stage and their intertemporal preferences.

Date: 1997-06
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Related works:
Journal Article: Standardization and the stability of collusion (1998)
Working Paper: Standardization and the stability of collusion (1998)
Working Paper: Standardization and the Stability of Collusion (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:298

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