Standardization and the Stability of Collusion

Luca Lambertini (), Sougata Poddar () and Dan Sasaki
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Dan Sasaki: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen

No 1997-14, CIE Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics

Abstract: We characterize the interplay between firms’ decision in terms of product standardization and the nature of their ensuing market behaviour. We prove the existence of a non-monotone relationship between firms’ decision at the product stage and their intertemporal preferences.

Keywords: FJVs; product innovation; collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 1997-06
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Published in: Economics Letters. March 1998; 58(3): 303-10

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Related works:
Journal Article: Standardization and the stability of collusion (1998)
Working Paper: Standardization and the stability of collusion (1998)
Working Paper: Standardization and the Stability of Collusion (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuieci:1997-14

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